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Abstract  
 
We consider the industrial districts “conductors” of social capital. Hence, we use the 
regional density of industrial districts to measure social capital and we analyse its 
impact on regional unemployment in Italy. By using regional data from the Italian 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT), we develop a pooled cross-sectional analysis 
based on the years 2001 and 2005. For a more robust analysis we divide 
unemployment into two types: general and youth. Interestingly, contrary to the 
theory of the “strength of position proposition” (Lin 2000), we find that both youth 
and general unemployment decreases with social capital only within low-educated 
individuals. In addition, within the low-educated group, empirical evidence shows 
that the magnitude of the effect of social capital on unemployment increases with the 
age.    
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1. Introduction 
 
In the broader view of social capital theory, communities investing in building 
cooperation, reciprocity and mutual trust increase the probability of solving 
collective action and asymmetric information problems. In more “pure” economic 
terms, these informal institutions should reduce transaction costs and disseminate 
technical and organizational knowledge (Saxenian 1996). For these reasons, scholars 
argue that social capital should reduce search and recruiting costs not only for job 
seekers but also for firms (Marsden 2001; Rebien 2010). In a theoretical framework, 
Montgomery (1991) shows that social capital should increase the probability of 
being hired because it reduces the asymmetric information between employers and 
employees and secures a better matching.  
To our knowledge, evidence on the impact of social capital on the labour market in 
Italy is quite limited to Pistaferri (1999) and Sabatini (2009). The former empirically 
shows that in Italy informal network increases the probability of receiving a job 
offer, but it is positively associated with lower earnings. The latter finds that strong 
and linking ties are likely to reduce labour precariousness.  
The aim of the paper is to detect the impact of social capital on regional 
unemployment disparities. To this purpose we use the regional density of industrial 
districts as social capital indicator. As Lyon (2005, p.8) underlines “Given the 
importance of the industrial districts in the Italian economy, the nation’s tightly-knit 
social fabric, and the influential nature of Putnam’s (1993) study, Italy is a 
particularly appropriate place to assess empirically the economic contribution of 
social capital”.  
By using regional data from the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT) we 
develop a pooled cross-sectional analysis based on the years 2001 and 2005. The 
functional forms we adopt state that regional unemployment disparities
1
 are function 
of social capital, besides other socio-economic factors. For a more robust analysis, 
we divide unemployment into two types: general and youth. We find that both youth 
and general unemployment decreases with social capital only within low-educated 
individuals. In addition, within the low-educated group, empirical evidence shows 
that the magnitude of the effect of social capital on unemployment increases with the 
age. 
The paper is structured as follows  
Section 2 illustrates how the clusters of the industrial districts can be considered 
“social capital conductor”. Section 3 present the social capital indicator and provides 
a general description of the distribution of the industrial districts in Italy. Section 4 
presents a descriptive analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The disparity indicators are those proposed by Felice (2009a). 
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2. The Community Network of the Industrial Districts as 
“Social Capital Conductor” 
 
 
Industrial districts are more than a simple reassertion of agglomeration economies 
(Harrison 1992) .The industrial district (ID) can be defined as a local system 
characterised by the active co-presence of a human community and a dominant 
industry
2
 consisting of a set of small independent firms specialising in different 
phases of the same production process (Sforzi 2002). This system is characterised by 
long-term socio-economic relationships among local firms involving trust, a blend of 
competition and collaboration and the role of local institutions (Guerrieri and 
Pietrobelli 2000). These repeated interactions between actors through continual 
formal and informal contracting and re-contracting facilitate the building of trust and 
mutual cooperation (Harrison 1992). In the Marshallian view, inside the industrial 
district, economic relationships are so influenced by social relationships that “the 
secrets of the industry are in the air”3 (Markusen 1996). Since Marshall, generalised 
trust and socially internalised community norms are recognised to be essential 
elements for the industrial districts to become vital actors in the regional and national 
economy (Leonardi 1995, Dei Ottati 1994, Sforzi 2002). This main framework 
drives this work to consider the community of the industrial district a “social capital 
conductor” where the members tend to build, develop and maintain a high level of 
civic engagement.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Marshallian’s Industrial Districts (a la Markusen) 
 
Source: Markusen (1996) 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Notice that the co-participation between the local community and the small firms in the production 
process is based on a common social culture (Sforzi 1994 p. 97 in Leonardi and Nanetti 1994). 
3
 Marshall is considered one of the pioneers who analysed industrial districts (Markusen 1996) 
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Figure 2.1 depicts the inter-firm linkages inside and outside the district. The ID 
presents many small companies buying and selling from each other for eventual 
export outside the region. They need to purchase raw materials and business services 
from outside the area (on the left) and they sell to external markets (on the right). 
This mechanism requires the presence of ties between members belonging to 
different companies inside the district community which cause a system of 
competition and collaboration. Figure 4.1 easily gives the idea of an industrial 
district acting as a collective entrepreneur (Pietrobelli 2000 in Bagella and Becchetti 
2000): many small independent firms specialised in one or few phases of the 
production cycle that have well-established relationships among each other.  
Table 2.1 shows the features of the Marshallian ID and the Italianate Version. The 
table indicates that the structure of the ID is based on small local companies that 
constantly trade among each other and that plan their investments locally. Moreover 
inside the districts the relationships are based on long-term non paper contracts. This 
makes the ID as a long-term network that facilitates inter-firm cooperation 
(Knorringa et al 1998). The labour market inside the district presents two particular 
characteristics. Firstly, the labour market is very flexible. It is quite common that 
workers move from a company to another bringing with them, not only the acquired 
knowledge (human capital), but also the previous connections with ex-colleagues or 
workmates (capital of connections). Secondly, the workers’ commitments are first 
with the district and second with the firms. This not only indicate the high civic 
engagement of the workers toward the ID but also explains why there is a very low 
degree of (out)migration. In other words, the individual considers himself first a 
member of an embedded community endowed with a particular identity and culture, 
and only secondly a worker of a firm
4
.   
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Features of Marshallian and Italianate Industrial Districts (a la 
Markusen) 
Features Marshallian ID Italianate Version 
Prevailing Mraket Structure 
 
Local SMEs Local SMEs 
Economies of Scale 
 
Low Low 
Intra-district Trade 
 
Highly developed  Highly developed  
Key Investments 
 
Local decision Local decision 
Buyer-Producer Cooperation 
 
 Important 
Regulation of Relationships Long-term contracts Long-term (non paper) 
contracts 
Labour Market Internal to the ID highly 
flexible 
Internal to the ID highly 
flexible 
Relationship External to the 
District 
Low cooperation with firms 
outside the district 
Low cooperation with firms 
outside the district 
                                                 
4
 Notice that industrial districts are also characterised by a high degree of (in)migration. This makes the 
industrial district an open network. The characteristic of the ID of being open networks is explained by 
Sforzi (1994 in Leonardi and Nanetti 1994) in terms of de-agglomeration process. More specifically, 
the district expands by increasing its territorial allocation of productive units and, hence its members. 
The de-agglomeration is likely to occur either when the district is still growing or when part of the 
production process is allocated outside the districts due to lower labour cost.     
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Workers’ Commitment 1st with ID, 2nd with enterprises   1st with ID, 2nd with enterprises   
Labour Immigration 
 
High High 
Labour (out)migration 
 
Low Low 
Local Cultural Identity 
 
Developed Developed 
Sources of Financing and 
Technical Assistance 
 
Internal to the ID Internal to the ID 
Patient Capital* 
 
Exists Exists 
Personnel Exchanges 
 
 High 
Cooperation among 
Competitors 
 
 High in order to share risk and 
innovation 
Innovation 
 
 Disproportionate shares of 
workers engaged in design and 
innovation 
 
Local Trade Association  Strong presence 
Local Government  Important 
Source: Integration between Markusen (1996) and Guerrieri-Pietrobelli (2000) 
* Presence of financial institutions willing to take long-term risks, for the confidence and information 
they possess 
 
 
A particular characteristic of Marshallian industrial districts is the presence of what 
is called “patient capital”. This indicates local financial institutions, integrated within 
the ID, willing to take long-term risks because of a high level of inside information 
and trust in local firms. 
The Italianate version presents some extra features. First of all, there is cooperation 
between buyers and producers and among competitors (Saxenian 1996). This implies 
on one hand that competitor firms share risks making the market more stable. On the 
other, the innovation capacity in the area benefits from a constant exchange of 
information among workers that cooperate and work together (Sexenian 1996). In 
fact, most of the technological knowledge is tacit, complex and systemic inside the 
district (Guerrieri et al 2000). Unlike Marshallian IDs, the Italianate version seems to 
imply a higher level of associational activities through the local trade associations 
that provide technical support, organise meeting and forums and spread a sense of 
collective spirit. In conclusion, it seems that both the classical Marshallian and the 
Italianate version show a system based on strong and weak connections through 
which cooperation and exchange of information take place.  
 
 
 
2.1 The “Custom of Reciprocal Co-Operation” and the “System of Mutual 
Information” 
 
The aim of this section is to shed light on the dynamic that permits high level of trust 
to be so common within an industrial district. Dei Ottati (1994) describes this 
dynamic through the “custom of reciprocal co-operation” mechanism. Within a 
network based on long term relationships, this mechanism helps to reproduce trust, 
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reducing the demand for substitutes for trust and the need to monitor which, in turn, 
implies less direct costs (monitoring costs in primis) and the possibility to generate 
distrust. All these functions are possible thanks to three main characteristics. Firstly, 
the labour mobility between firms reinforces the reciprocal interdependence and 
favours the perception of the human capital at the local industry as a kind of 
collective property. Secondly, the local agents can easily monitor each other and 
remember other agents’ past behaviours due to the limited geographical dimension 
of the IDs. Finally, the ability of monitoring at a lower cost gives the possibility to 
the members to punish those adopting strategies based on opportunistic behaviour 
(deviators) by withdrawing the willingness to conclude future transactions with 
them. This reaction along with social disapproval represents a useful grim strategy.  
The circulation of inside information, together with the relatively high level of trust, 
represents another collective resource of the industrial district (figure 2.2). The flow 
of information is facilitated not only by the high level of workers mobility 
(Markusen 1996) but also by the different roles that different types of firms have 
inside the district. In fact, Dei Ottati (1994) shows that there also exists a high level 
of what we call here “mutual information” among firms. More precisely, two types 
of firms co-exist within an ID. The first type is represented by the companies that are 
generally specialised in buying and selling (or “import-export”). This means that 
they possess the information on end-market conditions. The second type refers to 
firms (“subcontractors”) specialised in different phases of the production process 
that, therefore, possess information on the conditions of production. This scenario 
implies different types of information (about the market conditions, and about the 
production process) hold by different types of actors that, in turn, are responsible for 
different stages of the same “project”. Hence, this system of mutual information 
favours reciprocal co-operation inside the industrial district network.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Networks and embeddedness related to the Industrial Districts 
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2.2  Social Capital and the Trust-Cooperation Complex 
 
According to Paldam (2000) any social capital indicator needs to hold what he calls 
the trust-cooperation complex. This particular concept indicates that trust and 
cooperation are two interlinked elements that any social capital indicator should be 
able to satisfy somehow
5
.  
 
 
Trust  ease of voluntary cooperation   e                           (1) 
 
 
Equation (1) indicates the interlink between the internalised norms of generalised 
trust
6
 (Trust) and the ability of individuals of working together inside the community 
(ease of voluntary cooperation) while e is a small error.  
Our idea is that the “custom of reciprocal co-operation” and the “system of mutual 
information” theoretically support the relationship between the dind and the trust-
cooperation complex. This theoretical analysis has been reinforced lately by 
empirical evidence. A case study developed by Dei Ottati (2004) relative to the 
industrial district of Prato analyses the sub-contractors relationships and trust. By 
using the measures of “trust” proposed by Sako (1998), Dei Ottati (2004 p. 7) lists 
three different levels of trust. Firstly, competence trust related to the statement “The 
information we receive from our sub-contractors is useful to our firm”. Secondly, 
goodwill trust related to the statement “Our habitual sub-contractors will help us 
even if not foreseen by the agreement”. Thirdly, opportunism related to the statement 
“Given the chance, our subcontractors might try to take unfair advantage of our 
business”. The results of the survey show that more than 80% of the final firm 
entrepreneurs
7
 are strongly agreed with the first two statements and only about 5% 
with the opportunistic behaviour, even though the percentage agreed with the 
goodwill trust is much lower when the sample is made by phase firms. One of the 
most interesting results in the survey is the fact that 87% of the interviews agreed on 
the awareness of a local code of business conduct (Dei Ottati 2004 p. 8). These rules 
have been identified by Brusco (1999 p. 21-24) as the principal rules of the game in 
industrial districts. The first one is about the importance of trusting, even though 
cautiously, those who deserve it. The second one recognises that because of their 
reciprocal interdependence, individuals that work together on a continuous basis will 
never fully take advantage of the market power that is available to them. Each of 
them will take into account also the survival needs. The third one recognises as 
wrong and shameful the use of information, knowledge or a network of relationship 
for personal gain to the detriment of the firm that has involved them in specific 
                                                 
5
 Notice that in the literature it is still ambiguous whether these two concepts are causally linked one to 
each other. In Sonderskov’s (2008) impression this link in the literature seems to be treated more as an 
assumption rather than a theoretical and/or empirical justification.   
6
 Notice that “Generalised trust” is defined as the trust between the members of a community. As 
Sonderskov’s (2008) underlines this should not be confused with the trust towards a specific individual 
in a specific situation. Rather it identifies the belief that the other members of the community in general 
are trustworthy. 
7
 Due to the importance of division of labour inside the district the survey distinguishes between final 
firms and phase firms. The former indicates the firms specialised in the design and marketing of the 
district products. The latter refers to the firms specialised in one or more phases of the production 
process typical of the district (Dei Ottati 2004)  
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initiatives with good faith. Whether this system of norms or conduct code has been 
internalised by the ID community for altruism, for community culture (local moral 
code and community beliefs) or for rational choice is not object of our analysis. It is, 
instead, a strong signal that a system of values and norms has been internalised with 
the consequence of facilitating cooperation and spreading, at least, a certain level of 
trust among the members of that community.  
  
 
 
 
 
3. The New Social Capital Indicator and the Regional Density 
of Industrial Districts in Italy 
 
Given the characteristics of the industrial districts, we consider the ID as a particular 
community and its workers the members of this community. The idea is, therefore, 
to construct a new index by using the same structure and method applied in the 
Putnam’s one. To construct our index we need to follow three essential steps. The 
first step implies an empirical definition of the ID. The model that has been used to 
identify the industrial districts within a particular area is presented in the Appendix 
C. This is the standard model used not only by the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT) but also in the academic literature (Russo and Rossi 2001, Baffigi 
et al 1997, Sforzi 2002). The Italian national territory is divided into twenty regions 
with their own “regional government” and administration. In socio-economic terms, 
each region is composed by what are called local labour systems (LLS). The LLS 
indicates territorial groupings of municipalities (comuni) statistically comparable 
with two main characteristics. Firstly, each grouping may only include neighbouring 
municipalities belonging to no other territorial group. Secondly, each grouping is 
self-contained, in the sense that residents in each area mainly work for local firms, 
whose head-office is in one of the municipality making up the LLS. The second step 
implies the definition of industrial districts. The IDs are LLS with particular 
industrial concentration criteria. In particular, the IDs need to satisfy two conditions. 
Firstly, the level of employment of small firms operating in the LLS specialised in 
manufacturing activity must be greater than 50% of total employment in the same 
activity at the LLS level. Secondly, in case there is only one medium sized 
companies in the clusters, then the number of the workers in the small companies has 
to be greater than the 50% of the number of the workers in the medium sized 
company (such that the industrial system is not polarised). 
The third step implies the definition of the indicator. To this purpose we consider a 
population of workers   j = 1, 2,..., m which is the sum of all the workers belonging 
to the Local Labour System of the region. Then we want to know how many workers 
in the region work for the IDs 
dj industrial district has lj workers 
 



m
j
jdL
1
                       (2) 
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 dind
m
L
                                (3) 
 
Hence, dind indicates the density of industrial districts.   
The data used to construct the social capital indicator dind derive from the “8th 
General Census on Industry and Industrial Districts 2001” (ISTAT 2001). Figure 3.1 
shows that the distribution of the industrial districts is mainly concentrated on the 
Centre and on the North of the peninsula. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Industrial Districts in Italy 2001 
 
 
Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
 
 
In Italy, according to the last Census, there are 156 industrial districts over 686 local 
labour systems (Table 3.1). The Italian territory is divided into 20 institutional and 
physical regions each of them with a “regional government” provided with the right 
to marginally employ some macroeconomic policies (such as expenditure in public 
goods, local fiscal policy, expenditure in regional investment on different forms of 
capital). 
We can immediately notice that three out of the 20 regions do not have industrial 
districts. Two of these regions are located in the North and only one in the South. 
The two northern regions are located near the borders: Liguria in the North-West 
coast neighbouring with France, the Valle d’Aosta neighbouring with France and 
Switzerland. On the other hand, the region in the South where the industrial districts 
are absent is Calabria, apparently, the poorest economic area of the peninsula. Even 
though two of the “missing regions” are located in the North, properly that part of 
Italy presents the highest number of IDs. In terms of geographical concentration 
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(number of districts per hectares) the first two regions are Veneto (North-East) and 
Marche (Centre) with respectively values of 0.0354 and 0.0319. The region in the 
South with the highest density of IDs per hectares is Campania, but the value is quite 
far from the previous two (Density IDs = 0.0135). 
 
 
Table 3.1 Industrial Districts and Local labour Systems per regions 2001 
Regions IDs LLS 
 N. Districts Labour 
Units 
N. LLS Labour Units 
Piemonte 12 297,034           37  1,652,362 
Valle d'Aosta - -             3  51,568 
Lombardia 27 1,745,042           58  3,920,631 
Trentino Alto Adige 4 46,814           33  405,223 
Veneto 22 861,546           34  1,896,143 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3 123,244           11  474,146 
Liguria - -           16  537,251 
Emilia-Romagna 13 574,432           41  1,755,422 
Toscana 15 466,494           53  1,375,783 
Umbria 5 61,823           17  294,930 
Marche 27 435,063           33  592,336 
Lazio 2 31,542           25  1,745,432 
Abruzzo 6 96,859           19  396,422 
Molise 2 4,307             9  88,222 
Campania 6 26,177           54  1,267,384 
Puglia 8 144,096           44  940,182 
Basilicata 1 9,927           19  152,103 
Calabria - -           58  399,995 
Sicilia 2 3,236           77  1,034,949 
Sardegna 1 2,085           45  430,072 
ITALIA 156 4,929,721         686  19,410,556 
 Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 “dind” in the Italian regions (2001) 
Region Dind Region Dind 
Piemonte 0.180 Marche 0.734 
Valle d’Aosta 0 Lazio 0.018 
Lombardia 0.445 Abruzzo 0.244 
Trentino Alto Adige 0.116 Molise 0.049 
Veneto 0.454 Campania 0.021 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia 
0.260 Puglia 0.153 
Liguria 0 Basilicata 0.065 
Emilia Romagna 0.327 Calabria 0 
Toscana 0.339 Sicilia 0.003 
Umbria 0.210 Sardegna 0.005 
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4. Social Capital and Labour Market: Still an Open Dispute 
 
 
For the last decade, the empirical literature on labour market and social capital has 
been experiencing a growing trend. In his cross-countries analysis, Contini (2010) 
shows that the role of the institutional arrangements is crucial in understanding 
differences in employment rate among EU states. In countries where “institutions 
help the reconciliation of working time with family duties and child care”, women 
activity rate and youth employment is higher. Where these policies are missing, 
informal safety net and networks play a crucial role.  Another important aspect is 
related to the labour market efficiency. In labour markets where the formal search-
matching mechanism does not work then social connections and informal networks 
are likely to become a substitute. Pistaferri (1999), by using data from the Bank of 
Italy, shows that between 1991 and 1993 in Italy, the informal network represented a 
crucial channel able to raise the probability of receiving job offers, even though it 
was also associated to lower earnings. Sabatini (2005), in analysing the relationship 
between different forms of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) and labour 
market in Italy, noticed that bonding and linking ties can reduce labour 
precariousness. In the broader context of United States, through cross-sectional 
regression models, Casey and Christ (2005), find that social capital positively affects 
employment stability across American states. Montgomery et al (1991) explains this 
positive relationship in terms of social monitoring. More precisely, given that a 
consistent proportion of workers are hired through their direct and indirect 
connections, such as family and friends (Granovetter, 1973; Holzer, 1987), the 
employee referrals may work as screening device (Montgomery et al, 1991). 
However, this mechanism has to be considered with caution. It is quite reasonable 
arguing that where connections represent the main source of labour demand and 
supply, the market suffers from inefficiency (Pistaferri, 1999) due to a lack of 
information. One of the main consequences is that the mechanism is likely to affect 
the distribution of high/low-skills workers within the labour market. The literature 
presents quite controversial results regarding the role of social capital for high and 
low-skills workers. On the supply side, Pistaferri (1999) underlines that informal 
network is mainly used by low-skill individuals while high-skill workers are likely to 
rely on the formal job mechanism. Lin (1999) and Marsden (2001), on the contrary, 
argue that social network is more available for high skills individuals holding a 
better social position and possessing more social capital. On the demand side, some 
studies argue that social network is used when the position to be filled does not 
require particular cognitive skills (Holzer, 2006; Hellerstain et al, 2008). On the 
other hand, other works show that firms prefer to use their social capital for 
demanding and leading work positions. This is because they expect to find 
individuals that are more reliable (Boxmann, 1991; Rebien, 2010). To some extent, 
social capital might also be considered as an obstacle to enter the job market. 
Fontaine (2004) underlines that people with fewer social contacts may have lower 
opportunities than others. This means that a high density of workers embedded in the 
social networks may have the effect to raise the unemployment rate by consolidating 
the distance between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. 
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4.1 Youth and General Unemployment Disparities in Italy: Descriptive Analysis  
This section is far for providing a solution to the dispute previously mentioned. 
However, it certainly contributes to add some empirical evidence by using a different 
perspective. We apply the index of regional disparity to general and youth 
unemployment. The aim of this approach is to provide a broader picture of the 
macro-economic wealth of the country itself.  
 
Figure 4.1 Unemployment in Italy in 2001 and 2005 
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Source: Data from ISTAT www.istat.it 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Youth Unemployment in Italy in 2001 and 2005 
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Source: Data from ISTAT www.istat.it 
 
 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the cross-regional trend of the general and youth 
unemployment in Italy for the years 2001 and 2005. The cross-regional trend of both 
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youth and general unemployment rate presents a similar behaviour. The horizontal 
line indicates the average national unemployment rate in both of the graphs. This 
initial descriptive analysis shows clearly relevant differences in unemployment level 
among the regions. Both of the graphs seem to depict two faces of the same country. 
From the region Piemonte to the region Lazio (the range cover the North and Centre 
of the country) the level of general and youth unemployment is below the national 
average for most of the regions in both of the years 2001 and 2005. On the contrary 
from the region Abruzzo to Sardegna (all southern regions) most of the regions 
present a level of general and youth unemployment above the national average
8
. 
This scenario is better captured in tables 4.1 and 4.2 that show the disparity indices 
for each region constructed according to the equation (4).  
 
 
ITA
i
i
unempl
unempl
undisp     ,    
ITA
i
i
youth
youth
youthdisp                            (4) 
 
 
Where iunempl  and iyouth  indicate the level of general unemployment and youth 
unemployment respectively in the ith region while the suffix “ITA” indicates the 
variables at the national level. As for the income disparity index, the value of the 
index at the national level is equal to 1. Regions recording values greater than the 
national one means that they face a level of unemployment higher than the one at the 
country level. In simple words, they are above the horizontal line in figures 4.1 and 
4.2. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Regional Unemployment Disparities in Italy in 2001 and 2005 (Italy = 1) 
Regions 2001 2005 Regions 2001 2005 
Piemonte 0.688 0.604 Marche 0.495 0.606 
Valle d’Aosta 1.149 0.420 Lazio 1.150 1.000 
Lombardia 0.376 0.529 Abruzzo 0.983 1.018 
Trentino Alto 
Adige 0.344 0.409 Molise 1.070 1.305 
Veneto 0.501 0.549 Campania 2.060 1.930 
Friuli Ven. 
Giulia 0.477 0.533 Puglia 1.543 1.893 
Liguria 0.880 0.745 Basilicata 1.606 1.587 
Emilia Romagna 0.344 0.493 Calabria 2.117 1.862 
Toscana 0.468 0.680 Sicilia 2.409 2.100 
Umbria 0.691 0.789 Sardegna 1.517 1.674 
                                                 
8
 Notice that in the recent unemployment history of Italy the years 2001 and 2005 do not present any 
peculiarity. On a contrary case, problems of biases should be taken into account. In the Appendix of the 
chapter, figure B1 shows the unemployment rate in Italy during the period 1995-2008. The pattern of 
the variable shows a downward sloping trend without particular picks and though except for a 
minimum level in the 2007 when the unemployment rate is approximately 6%..  
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Table 4.2 Regional Youth Unemployment Disparities in Italy in 2001 and 2005 (Italy 
= 1) 
1 
Regions 2001 2005 Regions 2001 2005 
Piemonte 0.533 0.704 Marche 0.576 0.630 
Valle d’Aosta 0.899 0.414 Lazio 1.135 1.106 
Lombardia 0.449 0.543 Abruzzo 1.193 0.961 
Trentino Alto 
Adige 0.489 0.359 Molise 0.874 1.329 
Veneto 0.428 0.525 Campania 1.901 1.621 
Friuli Ven. 
Giulia 0.507 0.439 Puglia 1.326 1.477 
Liguria 0.642 0.834 Basilicata 1.842 1.528 
Emilia Romagna 0.360 0.445 Calabria 1.715 1.923 
Toscana 0.508 0.699 Sicilia 1.998 1.870 
Umbria 0.664 0.771 Sardegna 1.238 1.362 
 
 
According to table 4.1, in both of the years 2001 and 2005, the general 
unemployment disparity is greater than 1 in most of the southern regions with the 
exception of the region Abruzzo (in 2001). While the disparity index is definitively 
below 1 in all the northern and central regions except in the case of the regions Valle 
d’Aosta (1.149 in the 2001) and Lazio (1.150 in the 2001 and 1 in the 2005). The 
regions recording the highest disparity value, hence the highest unemployment rate, 
are the regions Sicilia, Calabria and Campania; all of them belonging to the southern 
group. In 2001 all these regions have a disparity value above 2, which means that 
their level of unemployment rate is more than double of the national average. On the 
contrary, the regions with the lowest disparity index (below 0.4) are the regions 
Lombardia (North West), Trentino Alto Adige (North East) and Emilia Romagna 
(North East), whose unemployment rate is less than half of the national average. 
From 2001 to 2005 the general unemployment rate shifts down by about 1.5%, from 
9.1% to 7.7%. From table 4.1 we might infer that this shift has been caused 
essentially by the consistent decreasing of unemployment in the regions Valle 
d’Aosta 9 , Sicilia, Calabria and Campania 10 .  However, even under these 
improvements, Sicilia, Calabria and Campania remain in the bottom of the low 
performing group of regions in 2005 as well. Table 4.2 shows similar patterns in 
terms of youth unemployment disparities, with some exceptions though. There is no 
region with a disparity index above 2 which means that no region records a youth 
unemployment rate that is more than double than the national average. From 2001 to 
2005, the youth unemployment rate did not change (from 24.1% in 2001 to 24% in 
2005), but we cannot confirm the same about its distribution across the regions. To 
                                                 
9
 Notice that the disparity index during the period 2001-2005 moves from 1.149 to 0.420. In “real” 
values this indicates that unemployment rates decreased from 10.5% to 3.2% 
10
 For Campania and Calabria the disparity indices shift below 2 in the 2005. The disparity index of 
Sicilia in the 2005 is still above 2 but it decreased tremendously. Translated into percentage, from 2001 
to 2005 the unemployment rate in Sicilia moves from 22% to 16.2% 
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this purpose, Table 4.3 shows a “cross pattern” description. We select all the regions 
whose general unemployment has decreased during the period 2001-2005 and we 
check whether the youth unemployment follows the same pattern. Table 4.3 shows 
that 8 out of 20 regions has experienced a decline in the general unemployment rate 
but in three of the eight regions (Piemonte, Liguria and Calabria) the youth 
unemployment rate went to the opposite direction. This might occur for many 
different reasons. For instance, it might indicate lower expectations for the category 
of the youth workers in that regions or it might be related to the average level of 
education. Alternatively it might be due to the youth dependency rate.  
 
Table 4.3 General Unemployment VS Youth Unemployment in Italy (2001-2005) 
Regions General Unemployment Youth Unemployment 
Piemonte Decrease Increase 
Valle d’Aosta Decrease Decrease 
Liguria Decrease Increase 
Lazio Decrease Decrease 
Campania Decrease Decrease 
Basilicata Decrease Decrease 
Calabria Decrease Increase 
Sicilia Decrease Decrease 
 
   
 
In a recent work about youth unemployment, social capital and institution across 
European countries, Contini (2010) shows that the youth dependency rate, YDR, 
represents one of the key factors positively influencing the youth employment rate. 
However, the deriving positive correlation between these two factors (Contini, 2010) 
appears to be very weak and not supported by strong empirical analysis. By 
repeating a similar exercise, in our case, we find opposite results (Figure 4.3). The 
youth dependency rate calculated as the proportion of individuals aged 15-24 to the 
population in working age 15-64 is positively correlated to the youth unemployment 
disparity. A possible explanation is related to the demographic effect on the labour 
market. Where the percentage of young individuals is lower, a larger proportion of 
youth active people receives a job offer (keeping of course constant productivity and 
aggregate demand). This might be the case for the region Calabria (Cal) which 
presents a youth dependency rate above the 20%. Actually, our exercise differs from 
the one computed by Contini (2010) in three elements. Firstly, while Contini (2010) 
uses the trend of YDR calculated for the period 1970-2005, our process, due to the 
lack of data, is focused on the period 2001-2005. Secondly, unlike Contini (2010) 
that uses employment, we use unemployment. It is not improbable that the two 
variables might present similar trends especially in countries or regions facing higher 
population growth rate. Finally, Contini (2010) compares EU countries while our 
analysis is cross regional.  
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Figure 4.3 Youth unemployment disparity and YDR across the Italian regions 2001- 
2005    
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What about unemployment and social capital? As we have anticipated at the 
beginning of this section, empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between 
social capital and employment. Table 4.4 ranks the regions from the highest value of 
dind to the lowest one (we exclude from the table the regions having dind equal to 
zero). 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 dind Ranking by median 
Median = 0.2096 (Umbria) 
 (Ma  Ve  Lo  To  ER  FVG  Abr  Tr ) >  Um >   (Pie  Pu  Ba  Mo  Cam  La  Sar  
Sic) 
 
 
 
The social capital proxy seems to present a quite similar pattern of the 
unemployment disparity indices. While, like for the case of unemployment, there is 
no southern region above the median value region except for Abruzzo (Abr), which 
is also the only southern region having a disparity index less than 1 in 2001. The 
regions Piemonte (Pie) and Lazio (La) are the two regions of the north and centre 
below the median value. The former is one of the three regions whose youth 
unemployment has increased while the general unemployment has decreased 
between 2001 and 2005 (table 4.3). The latter has a rate of unemployment above the 
country level (tables 4.1 and 4.2). Table 4.5 indicates the correlation among the 
social capital proxies and the unemployment indicators. The variable dind seems to 
be negatively correlated to all the unemployment indicators with a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.5 in all the cases.  
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Table 4.5 Correlation between social capital and unemployment disparity (obs. 40) 
 
 unempl Undisp youth youthdisp dind 
Unempl 1.000     
Undisp 0.909 1.000    
Youth 0.882 0.968 1.000   
Youthdisp 0.881 0.968 1.000 1.000  
Dind -0.521 -0.595 -0.572 -0.572 1.000 
Variables 
dind: our social capital indicator 
unempl: regional unemployment in 2001 and 2005 
undisp: regional unemployment disparity index (eq. 4) in 2001 and 2005 
youth: regional youth unemployment in 2001 and 2005 
youthdisp: regional youth unemployment disparity index (eq. 4) in 2001 and 2005 
   
 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
The model we are going to present in this section takes into account the patterns we 
have underlined in the previous section. The empirical analysis will be developed 
through a pooled cross section for the years 2001 and 2005. Based on previous 
empirical and theoretical works in the literature, we will consider general and youth 
unemployment levels and general and youth unemployment disparities expressed in 
the following functional form (equation 5).  
 
itititititit
j
it uydrtyproductivigradPIdindunemp   5413210     (5) 
 
where the index j indicates general and youth unemployment level and general and 
youth unemployment disparities, the suffix i indicates the region and t the years 2001 
and 2005.  The variables of unemployment are controlled by the two proxies of 
social capital (dind and the Putnam’s instrument PI). We control also for the 
proportion of individuals holding a graduate diploma (grad) since the level of 
education should theoretically facilitate the access to the job market. Following the 
economic theory, higher marginal product of labour should increase the employment 
rate and decrease unemployment. Therefore, we should expect the labour 
productivity variable (productivity) to be negatively related to unemployment 
disparities. The model considers also the youth dependency rate (ydr) as suggested 
by Contini (2010). As we have anticipated in the previous section, higher ydr should 
be positively associated to unemployment.  
Table 5.1 shows the results of the equation (5) for the different variables of 
unemployment. 
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Table 5.1  Social capital and unemployment disparity 
 Eq. 1 
unempl 
Eq. 2 
undisp 
Eq. 3 
youth 
Eq. 4 
youthdisp 
Dind -0.073*** 
(0.024) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.165*** 
(0.036) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
PI -0.888*** 
(0.096) 
-0.067*** 
(0.008) 
-1.409*** 
(0.190) 
-0.058*** 
(0.008) 
Grad -0.745*** 
(0.107) 
-0.040*** 
(0.008) 
-0.705*** 
(0.171) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
Productivity -0.013 
(0.105) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.187 
(0.135) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Ydr 0.649*** 
(0.176) 
0.065*** 
(0.012) 
1.362*** 
(0.252) 
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
Constant 25.571*** 
7.317) 
2.054*** 
(0.483) 
40.894*** 
(10.486) 
1.692*** 
(0.435) 
Adj. R 
Squared 
0.802 0.842 0.821 0.821 
Standard 
Error 
3.041 0.241 5.308 0.221 
N. Obs 40 40 40 40 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
Variables in the regressions 
dind: dind in the years 2001 and 2005 
PI: Putnam’s instrument in 2001 and 2005 
grad: regional proportion of individuals holding a university degree in 2000 and 2004 
productivity: regional productivity calculated as (regional product) / (total workers) for the years 2001 
and 2005 
ydr: regional youth dependency ratio calculated as n. youth aged 15-25 over total working population 
aged 15-65 for the years 2001 and 2005 
 
 
Empirical evidence seems to confirm that social capital reduces general and youth 
unemployment and cross regional unemployment disparities. Both of the social 
capital indicators are significant and 1% level in all the regressions. More precisely, 
the empirical results show that to a 10% increase of the indicator dind  follows a 
reduction of 0.73% of unemployment rate and 1.65% of youth unemployment rate. 
In terms of unemployment disparity, as dind increases by 1% the unemployment 
disparity index reduces by 0.009 while the youth unemployment disparity index by 
0.007. This means that the region facing a 1% increase of social capital would 
reduce its unemployment and youth unemployment disparity compared to the 
national level by respectively 0.9% and 0.7%. The impact of the Putnam’s 
instrument is stronger than dind regarding to unemployment rate and unemployment 
disparity.  
To this purpose, during our analysis, we have also tested whether the variable 
“district” can affect the performance of dind. More precisely, the high flexibility of 
the labour market inside a district might condition the power of the social capital 
proxy. If this is the case, we might expect that if we include the variable district in all 
the regressions, this should be negatively and significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable and the variable dind should loose its explanatory power. We 
have found that the variable “district” is negatively related to all the unemployment 
variables but not significant, while the explanatory power of dind remains unaltered 
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in all the regressions. Like social capital, the level of education is negatively and 
significantly related to general and youth unemployment and to their disparities 
indices. People holding a graduate diploma (grad) seem to have better access to the 
labour market. As economic theory predicts, labour productivity is negative 
correlated to unemployment even though it is not significant. Not surprisingly, the 
youth dependency ratio is positively and strongly significantly associated to 
unemployment.  
One of the possible elements that can make our analysis more robust is to include the 
dummy south in the regressions. As we have anticipated in the descriptive analysis, 
the disparities in both general and youth unemployment seem to divide the country 
into two main geographic areas: better performing North and depressing South. The 
indices of unemployment disparities undisp and youthdisp are greater than the unity 
in all the southern regions (with the exception of the regions Abruzzo and Molise). 
We test, by including the dummy, whether the social capital indicators are still 
significant even though the impact is less strong (table 5.2).  
According to the table 5.2, the dummy is positively and significantly related to 
unemployment. However, by including the dummy south, the explanatory power of 
the social capital and human capital indicators is unchanged. This result represents a 
further support for the social capital theory according to which social capital can 
represent a social asset able to reduce unemployment due to the imperfections in the 
labour market regardless the geographical location.  
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Social capital and unemployment disparity 
 Eq. 1 
Undisp 
Eq. 2 
youthdisp 
Dind -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
PI -0.051*** 
(0.008) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
Grad -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
productivity -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Ydr 0.047*** 
(0.013) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
South 0.357*** 
(0.139) 
0.327*** 
(0.109) 
constant 1.662*** 
(0.308) 
1.333*** 
(0.285) 
Adj. R Squared 0.868 0.850 
Standard Error 0.221 0.202 
N. Obs 40 40 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
Variables in the regressions (see table 5.1) - the dummy south indicates the southern regions (see 
Appendix B)     
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5.1 Social Capital and “low/high educated” Labour Force 
As previously anticipated, dealing with social capital and labour market drives the 
scholars to deal with one of the still open dilemmas: is social capital a more efficient 
channel for highly educated or for lowly educated workers? Indeed this issue is 
likely to be conditioned by the labour market structure. From the demand side, for 
instance, small firms, where the human resource sector is limited to the person of the 
firm owner, tend to recruit through their informal networks (Rebein 2010). Hence, 
for these types of firms and for some job positions (low skill requirements) the 
formal recruitment channels involving advertisement, assessment centres and 
screening of enrolees might be too costly. On the other hand, it is also true that 
occupying an important and leading responsible position is not only a matter of CV. 
Reputation and trust might play a crucial role in the recruitment process. From the 
supply side, informal network might represent one of the social resources available 
to the labour force. Individuals tend to enlarge their initial family network during the 
years of schooling and they extend it once they enter in the labour market. This 
process might somehow explain the theory of “the strength of position proposition” 
proposed by Lin (2001 pp. 75-76). According to this theory, the better the original 
position of an individual, the more likely this individual will access and use better 
social capital. In labour market terms, this might be translated into the dualism 
insider-outsider. Individuals inside the labour market for a longer period had more 
possibilities to intensify and enlarge their network enough to use it in a more 
efficient way than outsider. It is clear that under these particular circumstances we 
cannot say that the labour market is more efficient. It is likely to be the other way 
round. On the other hand, the strength of the initial position might be characterised 
by a higher educational level. It is not unpopular among social capital theorists to 
consider that better educated individuals can have the advantage to be involved into 
social circles and associations rich in resources (Coleman, 1990). This indicates that 
human and social capital, are likely to be complementary assets. In our analysis the 
question is how social capital affects the labour market when we consider high and 
low educated individuals. To this purpose, table 5.18 presents the results of a series 
of regressions. We consider three new variables. From the census of the population 
made by ISTAT in 2001, we consider individuals that do not hold the compulsory 
years of schooling (lowed01) and we interrelate social capital indicator dind with the 
variable grad, named scgrad, with the variable lowed0,1 named sclowed01
11
. Then, 
we include the two interactive variables in the regressions alternatively.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Notice that the variable lowed01 refers to the year 2001. Unfortunately we do not have the same 
variable for the year 2005 therefore in our analysis the effect of “low educated” individuals is lagged 
by 5 years with respect to the year 2005. It is not the first time that educational variables are lagged 
relative to the dependent variables. In their cross-country analysis Kanck and Keefer (1997) consider 
the variable of school enrolment lagged by more than 10 years relative to output growth and investment 
over GDP. Moreover, it is not the first time that social capital variables are interacted with other socio-
economic variables. For instance, still Knack and Keefer (1997) interact the variable “trust” with GDP.      
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Table 5.3 Social capital and “low/high educated” labour force  
 Eq. 1 
unempl  
high educated 
Eq. 2 
unempl 
low educated 
Eq. 3 
unempl 
high educated 
Eq. 4 
unempl 
low educated 
Dind -0.343*** 
(0.118) 
0.189 
(0.142) 
-0.454*** 
(0.152) 
0.384 
(0.237) 
PI -0.581*** 
(0.105) 
-0.571*** 
(0.107) 
-0.822*** 
(0.237) 
-0.808*** 
(0.237) 
Grad -0.532*** 
(0.158) 
-0.387*** 
(0.106) 
-0.066 
(0.219) 
0.097 
(0.180) 
Scgrad 0.013** 
(0.005) 
 0.014* 
(0.007) 
 
lowed01 1.054*** 
(0.201) 
1.303*** 
(0.298) 
2.432*** 
(0.376) 
2.920*** 
(0.418) 
sclowed01  -0.030* 
(0.016) 
 -0.062** 
(0.026) 
Constant 18.710*** 
(5.651) 
12.991** 
(5.128) 
13.035 
(9.400) 
4.501 
(9.547) 
Adj. R 
Squared 
0.853 0.845 0.845 0.853 
Standard 
Error 
2.623 2.686 4.943 4.802 
N. Obs 40 40 40 40 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
Variables in the regressions 
dind: dind: dind in the years 2001 and 2005 
PI: Putnam’s instrument in 2001 and 2005 
grad: regional proportion of individuals holding a university degree in 2000 and 2004 
scgrad: dind*grad interactive variable between social capital and high educated individuals 
lowed01: individuals that do not hold the compulsory years of schooling at the regional level in the 
year 2001 
sclowed01: dind*lowed01 interactive variable between social capital and low educated individuals 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows interesting results. When we consider “high-educated” individuals, 
social capital indicators are still negatively and significantly related to the level of 
general and youth unemployment, while the interactive variable scgrad is significant 
but positively correlated to the types of unemployment. One possible explanation 
might be related to the efficiency in labour market. When labour market is 
inefficient, “high-educated” individuals might rely more on their connections than on 
their professional abilities. This might increase rather than reduce unemployment
12
.  
On the other hand, when we consider “low-educated” individuals, the variable dind 
is not significant any longer, but the variable sclowed01 is negatively and 
significantly related to the types of unemployment. A 10% increase of low educated 
individuals holding a social capital asset would decrease the unemployment rate by 
0.3% and the youth unemployment rate by 0.62%. On the contrary, regions with 
                                                 
12
 Notice that the reverse might be also true. In a highly inefficient labour market it is more probable to 
find a job or to recruit a new worker mostly through connections than via search-matching formal 
channels. However, the regressions show the positive correlation between the educational level and the 
unemployment level which finds large support in economic literature. This might provide support to 
our interpretation even though we cannot avoid reverse causality problems.   
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higher proportion of “low-educated” individuals, without social asset, face higher 
levels of general and youth unemployment. Empirical evidence shows that a 1% 
increase of individuals not holding the compulsory education increases general and 
youth unemployment rate by 1.05% and 2.43% respectively. This result is coherent 
with the group of empirical works (Hellerstain et al, 2008; Ioannides and Loury, 
2004) that find social network a quite useful instrument for low qualified job offers. 
Contrary to this position, Lin (2001) argues that higher qualified individuals are 
more likely to be recruited via social network since they posses “better” social 
capital than lower qualified individuals. Our empirical analysis goes towards an 
opposite direction. What can be argued is that while higher qualified individuals 
might have access to a higher quality social network, they might have higher 
expectations as well which somehow limits the power of their social network.  
Moreover, from the demand side, high qualified positions need probably more 
recruitment tests (that go beyond the informal relationship) in order to verify the 
reliability of the candidate. By recalling Del Boca et al (1995), Pistaferri (1999) 
points out that Italy is probably the country, among the OECD group, with highest 
hiring and firing costs. Hence, due to the very high hiring costs, a formal recruitment 
process is not worth when a low skill position has to be filled.  If lower qualified 
positions correspond to lower paid job, then these results are also coherent with 
Pistaferri (1999) who finds that if social network increases the probability of 
receiving job offers, at the same time is also correlated to a lower salary. Further 
investigations drive our research towards some conclusions by Pistaferri (1999). 
More specifically, according to his analysis, informal network is positively related to 
less years of education and more years of labour market experience. For this reason, 
we set different variables of low educated individuals, according to age intervals 
(table 5.4). This new setting allows us to address the more or less efficient use of 
social capital, depending on the age interval the individual belongs to. For example, 
the variable lowed15 indicates the percentage of individuals, aging 15-24, that 
among their peers did not finish the compulsory years of schooling.   
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Proportion of individuals that have not finished the compulsory school 
Variable Lowed15 Lowed25 Lowed35 Lowed45 
Interval age 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 52 
Source: ISTAT 2001 
 
 
 
More mature and adult individuals are likely to possess a larger informal network 
and therefore more efficient social resources in order to enter the labour market (or 
alternatively in order not to exit the labour market). The reasons might be of 
different nature. In a more positive scenario, constant and more persistent 
interactions with other “members” of the individual’s community might increase the 
level of individual’s reputation and, hence, his/her reliability. The sense of trust and 
reciprocity, advanced by Putnam et al (1993), are most of the time the result of a 
relevant investment period on social networking. As with human capital, returns 
from investment on social capital might increase with its persistent use. Glaeser et al 
(2002), underlines that lifecycle effects predict that social capital increases and then 
declines after a certain age. In our specific data set, the last age interval stops at the 
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age of 52. This does not allow us to deal with a complete lifecycle. Apparently this 
inverse U shaped relationship between social capital and age should start to reduce 
under the retirement stage which is one of the last missing intervals in our data set. 
This missing interval seems to be in our opinion of minor problems. Actually, the 
65+ life period, in Italy, corresponds to the period of retirement and it is also 
excluded by the data on unemployment. In table 5.5 we present the results of the 
different age interval variables interacted with the social capital variable (dind) 
related to the level of regional unemployment.    
In all the regressions, Putnam’s instrument and the high educational level are always 
negatively and significantly correlated to the level of regional unemployment. In any 
specification, the variable indicating the proportion of “low educated” individuals is 
positively and significantly correlated to unemployment. As theory predicts, higher 
level of education facilitates a better access to the job market. Regions with a lower 
aggregate level of education are likely to face a higher level of unemployment. Our 
analysis confirms also the social capital and lifecycle theory. Up to the age of 34 the 
interactive variables scnoedu15 and scnoedu25 are not significant. It seems that only 
after that period of life (35+), social connections and network start to be effective for 
low-level educated individuals. A 10% increase of individuals between 35 and 44 
years, holding social asset, reduces the regional unemployment rate by 0.1%. The 
same increase of individuals in the interval 45-52 decreases the unemployment rate 
by 0.06% 
 
Table 5.5 Social capital and “low educated” unemployment 
 Eq.1 
Unempl 
age 15-24 
Eq.2 
Unempl 
age 25-34 
Eq.3 
Unempl 
age 35-44 
Eq.4 
Unempl 
age 45-52 
Dind -0.11 
(0.116) 
0.007 
(0.063) 
0.099 
(0.083) 
0.236 
(0.168) 
PI -0.698*** 
(0.138) 
-0.617*** 
(0.116) 
-0.539*** 
(0.096) 
-0.655*** 
(0.112) 
Grad -0.428*** 
(0.134) 
-0.400*** 
(0.123) 
-0.391*** 
(0.105) 
-0.438*** 
(0.112) 
lowed15 1.043*** 
(0.358) 
   
sclowed15 0.011 
(0.024) 
   
lowed25  0.633*** 
(0.184) 
  
sclowed25  -0.010 
(0.009) 
  
lowed35   0.451*** 
(0.099) 
 
sclowed35   -0.010* 
(0.005) 
 
lowed45    0.311*** 
(0.058) 
sclowed45    -0.006** 
(0.003) 
Constant 21.955*** 
(5.441) 
20.679*** 
(4.866) 
16.625*** 
(4.316) 
11.606** 
(5.172) 
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Adj. R 
Squared 
0.787 0.822 0.859 0.834 
Standard 
Error 
3.154 2.881 2.568 2.782 
N. Obs 40 40 40 40 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient 
Variables in the regressions  
dind, PI grad (see table 5.18) 
lowed15, lowed25, lowed35, lowed45 (see table 5.19) 
sclowed15: interactive variable dind*lowed15 
sclowed25: interactive variable dind*lowed25 
sclowed35: interactive variable dind*lowed35 
sclowed45: interactive variable dind*lowed45 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
This study investigates whether social capital can represent one of the explanatory 
factors of the regional unemployment differences in Italy.  
Empirical evidence shows at least three crucial results. Firstly, regions with higher 
level of social capital face lower level of youth and general unemployment. Social 
capital reduces cross regional unemployment disparities also when we control for the 
geographical location dummy south. Secondly, along to Pistaferri’s (1999) 
conclusions and contrary to the “strength of position proposition” advanced by Lin 
(2001), we find that in Italy social capital seems to be more “effective” for low-
educated individuals than for those highly educated. Finally, within the low-educated 
group, empirical evidence shows that “better” social capital increases with the age. 
This seems to follow the lifecycle and social capital theory. 
Like other empirical studies on social capital, this analysis suffers from some 
important weaknesses. The absence of a common and unique definition and the 
different methods of measurement represent the main weaknesses in the doctrine of 
social capital and this is something that affects almost all empirical studies (Sabatini, 
2005). These weaknesses are also exacerbated by the lack of a generally accepted 
theoretical framework and the lack of data especially in the form of time series. In 
empirical studies on social capital, causal relationships are very often, if not always, 
left to the interpretation of scholars. Association rather than causation represents the 
dominant outcome in most of the cases. Unfortunately, there is not a good 
prescription for avoiding these problems completely. More than one aspects of our 
work presents similar problems.  
Firstly, there is a rich debate on whether it is better a single or a composite indicator. 
On the one hand, even though single indicators are easier to understand, they might 
not capture the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon. On the other hand, a 
composite index is not able to explain which of the dimensions is affecting the 
dependent variable in that particular empirical context (Franke, 2005). In other 
words, grouping many dimensions of social capital together into one index might 
create conflicts among these dimensions. The trade-off between completeness and 
dimensional conflict is not solved in our study. We try to partially cover this gap by 
using more than one single social capital indicators in any empirical analysis. This 
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might provide a more comprehensive perspective even though it does not solve the 
lack of completeness. 
Secondly, reverse causality and endogeneity problems can be addressed in this work. 
The direction of the causality is not always clear. Does lower unemployment creates 
better condition to favour the production of social capital or the other way round? A 
set of social capital measures might capture also some other elements not taken into 
account in the research but maybe crucial for the interpretation of the results. One of 
the critiques (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Lyon 2005) that Helliwell and Putnam 
(2000) receive is the omission in their regressions of the geographical location of the 
Italian regions. Does a dummy south, for instance, lead to the same results? This 
work shows that the empirical evidence is not alterated by the dummy south when 
this is included in the functional form. With respect to the problems of endogeneity, 
these can be partially solved by using strong instrumental variables as in Guiso et al 
(2004) and Kanck and Keefer (1997). However, “the absence of any strong theories 
of aggregate social capital determination in the social science literature would create 
several problems in the choice of appropriate instruments” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 
2004 p.53). In addition, in small sample sizes (40 observation with only 5 years of 
time-gap), IV estimators can have a substantial bias which is one of the reasons why 
large samples are preferred (Wooldridge, 2006).    
Thirdly, the number of observations in our analysis is not very large. Furthermore, 
the lack of time series data on the variables of social capital reduces the possibility of 
establishing a causal relationship between dependent variables and regressors. We 
try to overcome this problem by using pooled cross sectional analysis in the form of 
  
yearst tt 512                    (7) 
 
Indeed, social capital variables are not very volatile from one year to another and 4-5 
years seems a reasonable length of time for them to show some changes in patterns 
or behaviour. Still, causal relationships cannot be shown empirically. However, with 
the support of the literature and the comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic 
context, the direction of the causality can be discussed. 
In view of the strengths and the weaknesses just mentioned, there remains space for 
further interesting research.  
At the beginning of 2012 the new Census on industrial districts will be published by 
the Italian National Statistics Bureau (ISTAT). This will allow us to enlarge the 
pooled cross section to a 10-year analytical view. Therefore, it will be possible to 
implement medium-long difference empirical models, as in Helliwell and Putnam 
(1995), and compare them to one-shot cross–sectional analysis. From this approach, 
interesting information about the indicator dind and PI is likely to be provided. The 
patterns of such variables and their relationships with other regional economic 
factors might provide a relevant contribution to the literature.  
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Appendix A  
 
Table A1 Variables  
 
Dependent Variables  
Undisp regional unemployment 
disparity 2001 and 2005 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
Unempl regional unemployment 
rate 2001 and 2005 
ISTAT 
Youth regional youth 
unemployment rate 2001 
and 2005 
ISTAT 
Youthdisp regional youth 
unemployment disparity 
2001 and 2005 
 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
Independent variables 
Dind ratio between workers 
belonging to the IDs of 
the region i and total 
workers in the region i in 
the 2001 and 2005 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
District number of the districts ISTAT 
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per region 2001 
grad regional proportion of 
individuals of 25 years 
old and below holding a 
degree 2001 and 2005 
ISTAT 
lowed01 regional proportion of 
individuals that do not 
hold the compulsory 
years of schooling 2001 
and 2005 
 
ISTAT 
lowed15 proportion of individuals 
aged 15-24 that have not 
finished the compulsory 
years of schooling 
ISTAT 
lowed25 proportion of individuals 
aged 25-34 that have not 
finished the compulsory 
years of schooling 
ISTAT 
lowed35 proportion of individuals 
aged 35-44 that have not 
finished the compulsory 
years of schooling 
ISTAT 
lowed45 proportion of individuals 
aged 45-52 that have not 
finished the compulsory 
years of schooling 
ISTAT 
PI Putnam’s instrument 
2001 and 2005 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
Pop regional population 2001 
and 2005 
ISTAT 
Productivity regional productivity 
calculated as regional 
product over total 
workers 2001 and 2005 
ISTAT 
Scgrad interaction between dind 
and grad in the form of 
dind*grad 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
sclowed01 interaction between dind 
and lowed01 in the form 
of dind*lowed01 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
sclowed15 interaction between dind 
and lowed15 in the form 
of dind*lowed15 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
sclowed25 interaction between dind 
and lowed25 in the form 
of dind*lowed25 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
sclowed35 interaction between dind 
and lowed35 in the form 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
31 
 
of dind*lowed35 
sclowed45 interaction between dind 
and lowed45 in the form 
of dind*lowed45 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
South geographical dummy 
indicating the southern 
regions 
ISTAT 
Ydr youth dependency ratio 
calculated as the ration 
between the number of 
youth aged 15-25 to the 
population in working 
age 15-65 (2001 and 
2005) 
Author’s elaboration by 
using data from ISTAT 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B  Geographic Partition of Italy 
 
North - West: Valle d’Aosta (VdA) Piemonte (Pie) Lombardia (Lo), Liguria (Lg),  
North - East Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG), Trentino Alto Adige (Ta), Veneto (Ve), 
Emilia Romagna (ER) 
Centre: Toscana (To), Marche (Ma), Umbria (Um), Lazio (La) 
South: Abruzzo (Ab), Molise (Mo), Campania (Ca), Puglia (Pu), Basilicata (Ba), 
Calabria (Cal), Sicilia (Sic), Sardegna (Sa)  
Islands: Sicilia (Sic), Sardegna (Sa) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
Census 2001: The Industrial Districts 
 
The industrial district is a local system characterised by the active co-presence of a 
human community and a dominant industry made up of a set of small independent 
firms specialised in different phases of the same production process. 
This type of industrial system is part of the so called Local Labour System (LLS) 
 
LLS: territorial grouping of municipalities statistically comparable  
IDs are LLS that meet particular industrial concentration criteria. 
 
How to identify IDs   
The process used in the Census is based on four phases  
1. Identify LLS mainly manufacturing  
32 
 
2. Identify LLS mainly manufacturing whose industrial economy is based on 
SMEs 
3. Identify the main industrial sub-sector (ex. textile) of these LLS 
4. Identify the IDs 
 
IDs Identification 
1) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing  
a) Compute the Concentration coefficient relative to the economic activity for each 
LLS 
 
totITAntotLLSn
atecoITAnatecoLLSn
,/,
,/,
 
 
LLSn,ateco = workers in each economic activity in a LLS 
ITAn,ateco = workers in each economic activity in Italy 
ateco = economic activity 
LLSn,tot = total workers (in the good and service market) in a LLS 
ITAn,tot = total workers (in the good and service market) in Italy 
  
b) Compare the LLS with a coefficient in the manufacturing industry higher than the 
national mean in order to derive the dominant economic activity. 
 
atecoITAntotITAntotLLSnatecoITAnatecoLLSn ,*)],/,(),/,[(   
 
 If the highest coefficient is related to the manufacturing industry, then the LLS is 
mainly manufacturing 
 
2) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing whose industrial economy is based on SMEs 
Consider three dimensional classes of enterprises 
 Small size 0-49 workers  
 Medium size 50-249 workers 
 Big size over 249 workers 
 
Compute the coefficient for each dimensional class  
 
manITAnmanLLSn
manclassITAnmanclassLLSn
,/,
),(/),(
 
 
LLSn(class),man = workers for each dimensional class in the manufacturing sector in 
the LLS 
ITAn(class),man = workers for each dimensional class in the manufacturing sector in 
Italy 
LLSn,man = workers in the manufacturing industry in a LLS 
ITAn,man = workers in the manufacturing industry in Italy 
 
 
 
3) Identify the main industrial sub-sector (ex. Textile) of these LLS 
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a) Compute the coefficient relative to each sub-sector (The census identifies 10 
sub-sectors) 
 
manITAnmanLLSn
subITAnsubLLSn
,/,
,/,
 
 
LLSn,sub = workers in each sub-sector in a manufacturing LLS 
ITAn,sub =  workers in each sub-sector in Italy 
LLSn,man = workers in the manufacturing sector in a manufacturing LLS 
ITAn,man = workers in the manufacturing sector in Italy 
 
b) Compare the LLS with a coefficient greater than 1 in order to derive the 
dominant sub-sector. 
 
subITAnmanITAnmanLLSnsubITAnsubLLSn ,*)],/,(),/,[(   
 
 
The highest coefficient identifies the sub-sector 
 
4) Identify the IDs 
Two conditions need to be satisfied 
a) The level of employment of small firms operating in the LLS specialised 
manufacturing activity must be greater than 50% of total employment in the same 
activity at the LLS level 
 
%50
_),(
_),(

psubtotLLSn
psubsmeLLSn
 
 
LLSn(sme),sub_p = workers in the principal sub-sector employed in the SMEs in a 
manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
LLSn(tot),sub_p = total workers in the principal sub-sector in a manufacturing LLS 
made by SMEs 
 
b) In case there is only one medium companies in the clusters, then the number 
of the workers in the small companies has to be greater than the 50% of the number 
of the workers in the medium company (such that the industrial system is not 
polarised) 
 
%50
_),(
_),(

psubmediumLLSn
psubsmallLLSn
 
  
LLSn(small),sub_p = Workers for small companies in the main sub-sector in a 
manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
LLSn(medium)sub_p = workers for a medium company (when there is only one 
medium company in the industrial system) in a manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
 
 
 
